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LEARNING FROM MISTAKES 
Systems analysis has become well established. Many governmental 
offices, industrial organizations, and international groups have 
built it into their research and decision-making processes. Others 
are experimenting with it, and still others are considering how it 
might help them. 
The interest, which is now worldwide, is not hard to under- 
stand. Analyzing systems of various kinds has helped to solve some 
important social, economic, and environmental problems, and it 
has thrown light on others that must eventually be solved. As an 
aid to establishing policy, systems analysis has been particularly 
useful where matters are complex, where objectives conflict, and 
where future planning is difficult. 
Yet despite its successes and the interest they have aroused 
throughout the world, systems analysis is far short of fulfilling its 
 he systems analyzed involve man, 
nature, and various products of 
man's society and his technology.3 
potential. One reason is that decision makers who might want to 
try it sometimes have trouble determining what it is and how it 
might help them. Its form is always tailored to the problem at 
hand, so a decision maker may have difficulty seeing how the 
approach to another's problem can be adapted to his own (see 
box, page 3). 
Another reason is that it sometimes goes wrong. Analysis 
techniques are never applied to easy problems, only hard ones, 
and in more than two decades of developing and refining methods, 
borrowing technology from other disciplines, and adapting to new 
applications, systems analysis has had some failures. 
Profiting from mistakes, though, is at the heart of systems 
analysis. The analyst works necessarily with evidence, assumptions, 
models of systems, and concepts that may be partially tested. He 
must translate the languages of diverse fields into common terms. 
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He must also learn the decision maker's language and understand 
clearly his objectives and the obstacles to achieving them. There are 
ways such a process can go wrong. 
Scientists at the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria, have a vantage point for 
observing the trial and error of systems analysis as a whole. They 
draw upon a wealth of real-world experience with it in many coun- 
tries. As part of IIASA's efforts to  advance the field, a small group 
of experienced analysts came to the Institute from several countries 
in 1977 to  discuss the most common mistakes of systems analysis 
and ways to avoid them. 
A guidebook for analysts and users emerged from their efforts: 
Pitfalls o f  Analysis (John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1980). Some 
of the main pitfalls discussed in the book are mentioned briefly on 
the following pages of this Executive Report. This presentation 
concentrates on common pitfalls that can be avoided by both ana- 
lysts and users, thus aiding both to achieve effective results. 
Adequacy and effectiveness 
The book notes at the outset that broad standards of success 
must come before any determination of failure. Its authors identify 
two types of systems analysis standards: 
Internal standards that apply to  the adequacy of the work on 
technical or scientific grounds. 
External standards that apply to  the effectivenessof the work 
in contributing to  sound policy decisions. 
Internal standards are set by systems analysts, who want 
answers to such questions as these: Was uncertainty handled ex- 
plicitly, or was it assumed away? How strong was the evidence? 
Were the conclusions tested for sensitivity to changes in the under- 
lying assumptions? Were the models tested extensively for credibil- 
ity? 
External standards come from users and other interested 
parties, who ask these questions: Were the conclusions presented 
in a clear and convincing manner and in time to assist the decision 
maker? Was the study understood by those for whom it was done? 
Did it influence them? Have all legitimate interests been considered? 
Were the conclusions of the analysis acceptable to the implementing 
organization? 
Analysts tend to evaluate their studies on technical adequacy; 
decision makers stress practical results. The editors of Pitfalls o f  
Analysis saw both types of standards as important and related. 
They organized their material to  present first some common pit- 
falls of technical adequacy and then some common pitfalls of 
WHAT SYSTEMS ANALYSTS DO 
Systems analysis is a process for organizing informa- 
tion to help make decisions. The choice of informa- 
tion and the means of organization depend on the 
nature of the decisions needed. 
The systems analyzed involve man, nature, and 
various products of man's society and his technology. 
The forms of analysis that have been applied to these 
systems have been refined and broadened in recent 
years. It is impossible to capture the wide range and 
diversity of applied systems analysis in a short defin- 
ition. But it is possible to describe briefly what sys- 
tems analysts do. They perform some or a l l  of these 
tasks: 
a Observe and describe the behavior of complex 
systems. 
a Build models to explain the observations and 
test their validity. 
a Describe important segments of the systems 
involved, using models in combination with other 
knowledge. 
a Devise programs and courses of action com- 
bining the evidence with the use of models and 
informed judgments. 
a Compare the alternative courses of action avail- 
able to decision makers. 
a Communicate the results to decision makers 
in various ways useful to them and in readily under- 
standable language. 
a Help implement decisions based on the alterna- 
tives provided. 
Evaluate the results of the implemented pro- 
grams. 
effectiveness. Chapters 2 through 4 that follow deal with adequacy; 
chapters 5 and 6 discuss effectiveness. The order i s  not chronolog- 
ical, because pitfalls o f  both types occur throughout the systems 
analysis process. 
ANALYZING FROM A TO Z 
To avoid the pitfalls of systems analysis it is important to know 
where they are likely to occur. This chapter scans the process from 
the earliest formulations of the problem until after recommends 
tions relating to the problem have been implemented. 
It arranges the material into five phases of analysis: setting 
the problem, gathering and refining data, developing tools and 
methods, constructi~ig the argument, and using the conclusions. 
The emphasis is on pitfalls relating to internal standards of adequacy 
(as noted on the preceding page). Chapter 5 arranges pitfalls relating 
to external standards of effectiveness into the same five phases of 
analysis. 
Setting the problem 
The problem-solving process starts before the problem has 
been identified. First comes an awareness that things are not as 
they should be. How that awareness gradually becomes translated 
into a description of the problem affects the outcome. The cultural, 
institutional, and professional backgrounds of the analysts and of 
the decision makers influence the way the problem becomes iden- 
tified, which in turn limits the solutions possible. These pitfalls 
occur during the process of identifying the problem. 
The user considers only the alternatives falling within his own 
jurisdiction, and the analyst accepts the formulation uncritically. 
This can result in suboptimal solutions. For example, inquiries of 
the Delaware River Estuary Comprehensive Study in the US were 
confined to the outdoor recreational possibilities of the Delaware 
River Estuary (for which the user was responsible). The study did 
not consider other - and probably better - alternatives for out- 
door recreaction in the area. 
The analyst's formulation of the problem is too limiting, and 
the user fails to question it. Again in the Delaware River study, 
sanitary engineers used dissolved oxygen in the water as the prin- 
cipal indicator of water quality. Economists responsible for a cost- 
benefit analysis accepted this formulation uncritically. This pro- 
duced a choice of policy alternatives for raising dissolved oxygen 
levels in the area with the worst pollution (between Philadelphia 
and Wilmington). But none of the alternatives would have made the 
river more suitable for recreation. 
The problem is formulated only in terms of how it affects the 
user. This can produce solutions that cause worse problems. But 
the analysis can rarely consider more than a few of the system's 
interrelations. The possibility of poor results must be weighed 
carefully against the possibility of unacceptable increases in the 
costs of analysis. 
When the problem is being identified, it is particularly difficult 
to produce and interpret data. The way the problem is conceived 
influences questions asked on opinion polls and attitude surveys, 
and this in turn affects the information received. Also, facts may 
be deceptive. For instance, a drop of a percentage point or  two in 
the growth rate of a country's gross national product is often 
seen as a cause for government action. In fact, national income 
figures are only accurate to  within 10 t o  15 percent, and foreign 
trade, unemployment, growth statistics, and other economic data 
are even less certain. 
Gathering and refining data 
Once the policy problem has been specified, new types of data 
come into play. Some are raw data (such as retail prices), and some 
are refined into specialized information (such as an index of con- 
sumer prices). Making use of data has such pitfalls as these: 
Since econometric model builders do not usually collect the 
primary data but rely on figures from a variety of sources, prob- 
lems of interpretation can be serious. Social and economic statis- 
tics are often collected not by logical classification schemes but by 
expedience - the availability of data, the feasibility of making 
 he ad hoc nature of much economic 
accounting is seldom publicized, and 
it can be overlooked by the data users.3 
estimates, or  the operating procedures of the data-gathering office. 
The ad hoc nature of much economic accounting is seldom publi- 
cized, and it can be overlooked by the data users. Problems of 
interpretation are compounded because the components are put 
together by statisticians who have not collected the data and 
because the information has gone through several manipulations 
by the time it reaches the analyst. 
After the analyst has obtained the necessary data, either 
directly or from secondary sources, transforming them into informa- 
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BEWARE OF THE TOOLS..  . 
Systems analysis is st i l l  developing, and as yet it 
has no generally accepted criteria of adequacy. Its 
composite nature - with descriptive, prescriptive, 
evaluative, and advocacy elements linked inseparably 
- makes such criteria particularly elusive. 
During this formative period, there has been a 
tendency to expect too much of mathematical pro- 
gramming, queuing theory, control theory, and other 
tools that have been successful in other disciplines 
and contexts. 
The tools of analysis are invaluable, but they 
cannot eliminate uncertainty and replace hard think- 
ing. Deep pitfalls lie ahead for analysts and for deci- 
sion makers who depend too much on the answers 
to questions provided just by the tools. 
tion usable in a model or in an analytic argument is a crucial step. 
Such refining requires skills different from those of setting the 
problem and collecting the data. Pitfalls lurk in deciding which of 
many possibilities are the significant data to transform for use in a 
model or equation and in adjusting the model to make it fit the 
data. Standard statistical tests help in judging the quality of the fit, 
but a purely statistical evaluation cannot guarantee that the right 
data are chosen. 
Developing tools and methods 
A number of common pitfalls lie in choosing and applying 
the right tools and methods from the wide assortment now available 
to analysts. The risks are increased by the heavy dependence of 
systems analysis on other disciplines (see box above). Large-scale 
model building draws on mathematics, statistics, and economics. 
The problem under consideration usually brings in still other dis- 
ciplines, which may range as widely as, for example, biology and 
architecture. The broadly interdisciplinary aspect of the work 
requires a constant effort to avoid misunderstandings. Most of the 
pitfalls relating to the tools and methods of systems analysis are 
failures of communication. 
Compromises sometimes establish common language between 
scientists without producing true understanding. The result can be 
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. . . AND BEWARE OF THE TERMS 
Scientists sometimes use common words and terms 
in a technical sense that can mislead nonscientists. 
The terms (as well as the tools) of  systems analysis 
can interfere with communications between analysts 
and decision makers. 
It is widely recognized that subjective judgment 
plays a key role in successful analysis. But some of its 
advocates suggest a scientific precision their craft 
cannot provide by overusing such terms as "quantifi- 
cation," "optimization," and "formalization." 
Written descriptions of analytic methods that 
rely too heavily on technical termsand formulas also 
cause misconceptions. Scientific theories and formu- 
las cannot guide critical choices among alternative 
assumptions, data, and methods of analysis. 
a composite jargon that lacks depth and tends to  mask ambiguities 
and subtle differences in meanings. When concepts and techniques 
are removed from their disciplinary context, they can become 
stereotypes - with limitations not easily seen by people who want 
immediate applicability. 
The scientific worth of a field is sometimes assumed to be 
proportional to its mathematical or  statistical content. Too much 
may be expected of the numbers. Under such assumptions, quanti- 
fication and algorithmic elegance can become ends in themselves, 
at the expense of whatever cannot easily be quantified. This can 
prevent a deeper understanding of the substance of the problem. 
Constructing the argument 
The argument links information with conclusions. It is 
typically a complex blend of methodological considerations, 
factual statements, interpretations, evaluations, and recommenda- 
tions. A wrong assessment of the strength and fit of the evidence 
before it is included in the argument can lead to  pitfalls in drawing 
conclusions. 
In presenting the argument, information is not the same as 
evidence. Information becomes evidence when it is introduced at 
a specific point of the argument as an aid in persuading people. 
An inappropriate selection of data or models, their placement at 
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the wrong point in the argument, o r  a presentation inappropriate 
to the audience can destroy the effectiveness of the information 
as evidence. 
In judging the acceptable level of accuracy for  data used as 
evidence, different standards should be applied to different kinds 
of data. For example, in the natural sciences, an error of  a billion 
years is acceptable for estimates of the age of the earth, while the 
value of  a physical constant may be known with highly exact 
accuracy . 
The contemporary fashion of  using mathematical arguments 
on every possible occasion produces a tendency to accept numerical 
results as facts rather than as evidence. The sensitivity of these 
results t o  changes in data, the model, or  in the estimation proce- 
dures is easily forgotten. It  may not  be possible t o  determine with 
any reliable accuracy which of these types of  changes might have 
the greatest effects o n  the numerical results. 
The value of large-scale models as evidence is often doubtful. 
Poor documentation can make it almost impossible for anyone but 
the modelers themselves to reproduce the results. On the other 
hand, complete documentation would be too voluminous to be 
digested - even by an expert evaluator. 
Using the conclusions 
The conclusions of an analytic study may be presented as a 
forecast, the clarification of an issue, a recommendation, an assess- 
ment of  ongoing policies, a new idea, o r  a different perspective o n  
an old policy problem. Whatever the nature of the presentation, i t  
deals in abstract terms - poverty, health, unemployment, educa- 
tion, o r  others. This can lead to  pitfalls in the communication and' 
implementation of  the conclusions, particularly when an abstract 
term has been used in a special sense. 
The analyst may fail t o  see that rational arguments alone d o  
no t  determine attitudes. Persuasion is involved in any attempt to 
suggest a new view, judgment, o r  course of action. To be effective, 
the analyst must be an advocate, but he is also a believer in the 
virtues of the scientific method, and this belief is generally associ- 
ated with a distaste for the problems and the requirements of  com- 
munication and persuasion. 
The persuasion process must be seen as part of the analysis. 
It may be effective to  d o  the study in two stages - finding out  
what t o  recommend and recommending it convincingly - but the 
two stages must form a single process. The most serious pitfalls of 
applied systems analysis await those who separate planning from 
deciding and using, or  thinking from doing. 
TO GET A GOOD MODEL 
Systems analysis usually, but not  always, involves modeling. Model- 
ing is a term for simulating the systems being analyzed. It  is done 
many ways - empirically, mathematically, and others. Several 
types of  modeling are often combined in a single study. Computers 
are sometimes - but not  always - used. 
However the modeling is done, it is important t o  bear in mind 
that formulating the problem and modeling are closely related. 
Modeling must be considered from the start, and this chapter notes 
some of the  ways this initial phase of  analysis can go wrong. 
Formulation dangers 
The systems analysis process starts when someone is dis- 
satisfied with a current or  projected state of affairs. He may have 
only the vaguest idea where the problem lies. By the time the ana- 
lyst arrives, some version of the problem will have been expressed. 
The analyst must first identify the problem anew (see box below) 
and then limit its scope. The  task is difficult. He must find an 
CONFUSING MEANS WITH ENDS 
A decision maker says his goal is to choose a site in 
his district for a new comprehensive health center. 
His actual goal - to improve health services in his 
community - has not been identified. This goal 
might be achieved more effectively by one or more 
of several other means: by establishing several small 
neighborhood health centers, by expanding the out- 
patient facilities of existing hospitals, by encouraging 
physicians to form more group practices, or by in- 
creasing services in medical specialties with heavy 
patient loads. If the analyst in this case merely sets 
out to find the optimum site for a health center, he 
will not use the full potential of analysis - and he 
runs the risk that a better plan may come to  light 
and push his work aside. 
acceptable and implementable solution within economic, political, 
technological, organizational, and other restraints. This formula- 
tion-and-modeling process can go wrong in a number of ways. 
A desire to accept the user's appraisal of the situation com- 
bined with eagerness to get on with the analysis can result in not 
paying enough attention to formulating the problem. This can 
produce work that has little relation to the basic issues or that can- 
not be carried through to implementation with available time and 
resources. 
The formulation can be inappropriate for the use intended. 
For instance, to identify alternative policies, many variations must 
usually be screened rapidly and inexpensively. But for implementa- 
tion - such as choosing among similar vehicles after a general 
means of transportation has been selected - the analysis must be 
detailed and concrete. In such a case the alternatives are similar, so 
they differ in detail rather than in concept. The most common pit- 
fall of this type is to provide detailed and concrete analysis of 
limited alternatives for implementation when a wide variety of 
alternative policies needs to be considered. 
Goals cannot be set independently of the means to obtain 
them. It is usually impossible to select satisfactory objectives with- 
out some idea of their costs and difficulties. For instance, the goal 
of landing a man on the moon was not set until the achievement 
became feasible. 
It is not completely unknown for a decision maker's con- 
straints to be arbitrary and ill-founded. Some users have refused 
to consider alternatives, for example, merely because they were 
proposed by others in their organizations. Here again, sufficient 
attention to the formulation can avert serious problems later on. 
In formulating the problem, achievement must often be 
measured by surrogates. A good surrogate tells how well an ob- 
jective is being attained, but pitfalls lie in not recognizing its 
limitations. For instance, mortality rates are used to measure the 
health status of a population. This provides a gauge, but mortality 
rates do not reflect many factors that areimportant togood health. 
Similar dangers lurk in measuring output by input, such as com- 
paring the quality of primary school education in various districts 
in terms of expenditures per pupil. 
Other difficulties arise when the analyst misjudges the com- 
plexity of problem solving in the practical world of affairs as 
contrasted to the laboratory orclassroom. The analyst must under- 
stand how problems in the real world tend to proliferate. One 
danger lies in failing to take important consequences into considera- 
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tion. Another is to try to do more than time and resources allow. 
The analyst must guard against bias, particularly at the start. 
Some biases are well known, such as deliberately giving preference 
to aspects of the problem that are easy to quantify. Others are 
more subtle, such as biases introduced because the analyst uncon- 
sciously acquires the preferences and goals of the particular seg- 
ment of the organization for which he works. Parochialism and 
adherence to cherished beliefs are major causes of miscalculations. 
Modeling dangers 
There are many forms of models - physical, natural language, 
mathematical equations, computer programs, and others. The 
method of prediction may be judgment, physical manipulation, 
numerical approximation, simulation, and others. The role of the 
policy model is to tell what will happen if the decision maker 
adopts a particular course of  action, and in some cases to  indicate 
the best course. 
Analysts sometimes confuse modeling with analysis - and 
even with policy making. Models are only one of the steps of anal- 
ysis. The process includes searching out the right problem, design- 
ing alternatives for consideration, interpreting the model, and 
C ~ h e  danger is in acting 
as if the model were more 
important than the problem.) 
relating the interpretation to the decision maker's problem. The 
danger is in acting as if the model were more important than the 
problem. At worst, the analyst concentrates on fitting the model 
to the problem situation without thought of the problem itself, 
the decision to be made, or  the decision maker's needs. The model 
and the results of analysis may then be irrelevant and unusable. 
The analyst may favor a particular modeling approach - opti- 
mization, systems dynamics, or input-output - and adapt the 
problem to fit the approach. For instance, simulation may be chosen 
as the best-understood, easiest to set up, and cheapest technique. 
But it can sometimes produce an undesirable model because it 
offers no explanation of observed results and because it is slow, 
which may raise costs to unacceptable levels. 
Uncertainties about which something is known or  at least 
can be inferred with some confidence tend to get more attention 
than uncertainties about which little is known. The calculable 
uncertainties are seen as a challenge. Neglecting the more difficult 
uncertainties can give poor results that cause new problems when 
implemented. 
Some models are designed for relevance with the problem as 
a guide. Others aim for realism, trying t o  simulate the real world in 
detail so that many questions can be answered about the situation. 
For instance, there have been attempts to model the behavior of a 
city, its population, and its government so realistically that the 
model will predict growth, population movement, industrial devel- 
opment, and other changes. Then if the analyst is criticized for 
omitting aspects of the situation, he can only make the model 
even more inclusive and detailed. This may not stop the criticism 
because many important factors will still be left out. Or the model 
may become too complex to handle. To avoid such pitfalls, the 
problem should determine what goes into the model. 
It is particularly dangerous to  assume that the model can be 
validated conclusively. At best it is possible to  have a good under- 
standing of the model's strengths and weaknesses. I t  is evidence - 
useful in drawing conclusions but not the final word on what the 
future can bring. 
Models are sometimes built to  satisfy academic criteria rather 
than policy goals. Modelers ordinarily come from the academic 
world, and so do their rewards. From the academic point of view, 
the ideal model permits a large number of inferences not perceiv- 
able by direct observation. It derives power from a minimum of 
carefully selected assumptions, is cost effective, and is capable of 
reproducing results based on the system's past behavior. From the 
decision maker's point of view, though, the ideal model is relevant, 
reliable, cost effective, and able to  produce findings that can be 
used as a basis for action. 
Many modelers assume a policy model can be made compre- 
hensive enough to internalize the policy-making process, capturing 
the user's preferences and constraints and substituting for the 
decision maker. While this can be done in some narrowly prescribed 
situations, decision makers should not expect merely to  plug in 
the numbers and get back correct decisions on complex matters. 
Ignoring or minimizing the importance of the costs of the 
analysis is one of the most serious errors analysts can make. Users 
need realistic information on the costs of the analysis, the costs of 
delaying action, and the costs of implementing the policy alterna- 
tive chosen. As the next chapter indicates, costs are the cause of 
many difficulties in systems analysis applications. 
THE COSTS OF ALTERNATIVES 
Analysts and users alike tend to underestimate the importance of 
knowing the costs of policy alternatives. Serious difficulties arise 
from failures that range from ignoring costs altogether to  missing 
good cost alternatives. Before starting an analysis, users should 
know the costing dangers outlined here. 
Ignoring costs altogether 
While most analysts avoid the folly of paying no heed t o  costs, 
the error is common enough to  note. Goals may be considered vital 
at any cost because of concern for lives, human dignity, o r  the 
environment. But such high ideals are mistakenly conceived because 
<contrary to a common assumption, 
the more important the goal, the 
more important the cost analysis.) 
goals and costs are closely bound together. Painstaking considera- 
tion of costs can bring to  light feasible alternatives for reaching 
goals. Contrary t o  a common assumption, the more important the 
goal, the more important the cost analysis. 
Seeing only some of the costs 
The care with which cost data are collected, the sophistica- 
tion of cost formulas, and the caution with which aggregate cost 
projections are presented all distract from the most critical aspect 
of cost analysis - completeness. Impressively supported fine esti- 
mates of some tiny part of total costs merely create an illusion of 
completeness. 
The cost analysts rnay argue that they should restrict their 
elforts t o  the bounds of their competence. But this can sometimes 
amount t o  the easily measurable aspects of costs, which may then 
be presented as an estimate of total costs. Experienced cost ana- 
lysts are aware of several types of costs: monetary expenditures, 
other costs that can be measured in monetary units, costs that can 
be quantified in some way other than monetary units, and costs 
that resist any reliable quantification. All these costs need attention. 
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8 Long-run costs are also important. Both the analysts and the 
users may be inclined to neglect the costs of the distant future. 
The analysts may find these costs difficult to identify and assess; 
the users may have near horizons because of short-term political 
appointments. 
The different kinds of costs 
The way the costs of alternatives relate to the analysis must 
be considered carefully. A false picture of the process can be drawn 
by considering too few - or too many - cost factors. 
Including irrelevant costs in estimates is just as common as 
ignoring relevant costs. Only the costs that result from the specific 
decision being analyzed are relevant. 
Failure to sort out relevant costs is especially likely when 
costs are averaged. For instance, in deciding whether to expand a 
program, variable costs, but not fixed costs, should be in the esti- 
mate. Or, in deciding whether to complete or to continue a program, 
incremental costs, but not sunk costs, should be included. Recurring 
and nonrecurring costs should also be differentiated when changes 
in a program are contemplated. 
Relevance and concern are sometimes confused. If you paint 
your house purple, it will lower its value - and the value of your 
neighbor's house as well. Similarly, it is tempting to assume that 
cost analysis should be confined to a narrow scope. But whether 
the scope is narrow or not, the analyst should always make himself 
aware of the user's concern, or lack of it, for broader constituencies. 
The tendency is for an agency or community to ignore other agen- 
cies and communities - a deficiency that the cost analyst must 
make an effort to prevent. 
Levels of analysis are sometimes confused. The analyst may 
merely identify the resources needed to  carry out a plan. Or, he 
may attempt to identify the most attractive alternative uses of the 
resources or go further and assess the benefits of the alternatives. 
If different components of the cost analysis have extended through 
various levels of analysis, they must not be omitted or double- 
counted. 
The different cost dimensions 
In all matters relating to  costs, no pitfall is more tempting 
than to assume that money or monetary measures can simply be 
added up. Money values differ in different situations. 
The costs and benefits accruing to separate entities of a p r e  
gram cannot easily be compared. Say a government agency must 
choose between two sites for a power generating plant that will 
not be welcome by property owners in either area. The agency 
wants to compare costs to home owners at each site. A survey 
estimates that $3,500 a year would compensate the home owners 
at one site, while $4,200 a year would be needed for those at the 
other site. If the agency is planning compensation, a direct com- 
parison of the costs at the two sites is reasonable. But if no com- 
pensation is intended, so that the costs must be absorbed by the 
home owners, the comparison of costs may not be reasonable. 
At one site, homeowner income levels may be considerably higher 
than at the other, so that these residents will have a far smaller 
cost measured as a percentage of income. 
Means of determining the depreciation of currency have 
limitations that are not always apparent. Cost analyses for govern- 
mental agencies use a variety of yardsticks to  measure currency 
erosion - prime interest rates, government bond rates, estimates 
of the marginal efficiency of capital, and indexes of consumer 
prices. Each means has its characteristic strengths and weaknesses, 
and they can affect the cost analysis greatly. 
Cost analysis can be affected significantly when expenditures 
are made ahead of schedule or postponed. This results partly from 
depreciation of currency over time and partly from budgetary and 
other constraints within the funding agency. A simplified example 
suggests how the factors involved can interact. An agency postpones 
repairs to  the roof of a building. Next year, repairing the roof and 
the damage that leaks will have caused by then increases the total 
expenditure by 50%, not counting a 1Wo erosion of the currency 
anticipated for the coming year. The agency can also postpone 
another expenditure of like amount at an increased cost of only 
25% over a year's time. Other considerations aside, fixing the roof 
and postponing other expendituresmakes sense. But if the analyst's 
attention is focused at a higher level of authority, it may prove far 
more practical to shift funds - and make both of these expenditures 
right away for the savings possible. 
Summing up costs 
Cost analysis must be seen as analysis of alternatives. If not, 
pitfalls of two general types lie ahead. 
Costs that are not easily included in monetary calculations 
are neglected. The danger is in allowing attention to  shift from 
costs to the monetary units used to measure them. 
Analysts and decision makers seek a single answer to  costs, 
which can only rarely be found. The danger is in not recognizing 
a range of alternatives that depend among other things on the level 
of authority, the influence of that authority, and the resources 
available. 
TO BE EFFECTIVE 
The pitfalls of systems analysis listed in chapters 2 through 4 of 
this report are internal. They are danger points where the adequacy 
of the analysis can be compromised. The remainder of this report 
deals with external factors - points where a technically sound 
analysis can lose effectiveness. 
As noted earlier, the presentation is not chronological. Some 
of the internal pitfalls mentioned previously occur in late stages of 
analysis, while some of the external pitfalls discussed in chapters 5 
and 6 occur at the start. 
Knowing the decision maker 
A technically sound analysis may fail because of misunder- 
standings that were not recognized in time. The damage is progres- 
sive. Eventually the decision maker is likely to  judge the work mis- 
guided or irrelevant, and then there is very little hope that it will 
be effective. The shortcoming in such cases is usually the same: 
the analyst did not know what matters most to  the user. The work 
can then go wrong several ways. 
e The decision maker may work in a setting where opinions 
count more than facts. The practical reality of his needs may blur 
distinctions between facts and values, private and public interest, 
political process and policy, and decision making and moral judg- 
ment. The analyst's alternatives must fit the user's options. 
The analyst may make his results more complex than neces- 
sary. To  be convincing, the analysis must be clear. Unfamiliarity 
with the user's needs can lead to foggy prose, vague references, 
and reports that offer more detail than needed. This can cause an 
otherwise sound analysis to  be rejected. 
e Some policy is made by a single decision maker, but usually 
a number of people are involved. An analysis directed to  a single, 
rational decision maker is rarely appropriate. Some analysts explain 
policy outcomes in terms of interactions among social institutions, 
groups, and individuals who share the power to influence decisions. 
Other analysts concentrate on organizational settings. Either way, 
the dynamics of various types of group behavior must often be 
considered to avoid pitfalls in putting the analysis to use. The 
analyst and the user may collaborate on various strategies to make 
the work effective, such as aiming for satisfaction rather than max- 
imum improvement, o r  focusing on bottlenecks and proceeding 
incrementally. 
Gaining an understanding of  the decision maker and his needs 
can also invite dangers. The analyst who begins to think like the 
user of the analysis may adopt the user's point of  view uncritically. 
Unconsciously sharing the user's biases and blind spots can under- 
mine the analyst's scientific detachment. The analyst must under- 
stand the user's motives in seeking the analysis without making them 
his own. 
The pitfalls outlined above suggest how an analysis with high 
marks for  technical adequacy can fail t o  be effective a t  any point 
in the analysis from A t o  Z. T o  illustrate the ways analysis can be 
diverted from its aims, some examples from actual cases are pre- 
sented here. They are arranged by the main phases of analysis as 
outlined in Chapter 2. 
Setting the problem and gathering data 
The Secretary of the US Department of the Interior had to  
decide whether t o  continue building the Bonneville Unit of the 
Central Utah Project. The project was a large, multipurpose irriga- 
tion and water development system. He had t o  know whether 
to approve awarding the contracts for  building Currant Creek Dam, 
the next part of the Bonneville Unit t o  be undertaken. The question 
was largely one of priorities. 
His analysts studied issues and alternatives and presented 
their findings, which argued that completing the unit would create 
(A technically sound analysis may 
fail because of misunderstandings 
that were not recognized in time.3 
problems. Cheaper and less environmentally damaging alternatives 
were available t o  meet the most important water needs of the area. 
Also, the alternative sites would avoid troublesome questions of 
the water rights of the Ute Indian tribe, a matter of  growing con- 
cern in the area. 
The Secretary then wanted t o  know the consequences of 
building only Currant Creek Dam - without completing the entire 
Bonneville Unit. Would it be useful without building tunnels, 
aqueducts, o r  pumping plants? If so, and if the construction would 
not pose serious cost, environmental, o r  Indian water rights prob- 
lems, would it be better to go ahead while taking more time to 
study the bigger issues? 
Enamored of the task of evaluating the entire Bonneville unit, 
the analysts had not considered the narrower possibility that was 
attractive to the Secretary. Under political pressure to go ahead 
with the construction and facing other issues that were more im- 
portant to the department, he hadmerely wanted to know whether 
he could delay consideration of the bigger issues. In the end, the 
answer was yes. The analysts had not erred in evaluating the 
Bonneville Unit as a whole. Their mistake was in failing to  consider 
less exciting but more practical alternatives. 
Developing tools and methods 
A study of the San Francisco housing market was conducted 
as part of the city's Community Renewal Program. The overall 
objective of the analysis was to develop a comprehensive, integrated 
policy for public and private actions that would improve the living 
environment of the city, with special concentration on the housing 
market. The task of the analysts was to develop a framework that 
adequately replicated the operation of the private housing market. 
The first problem was setting geographical limits on the study. 
They settled on San Francisco, knowing that the relevant housing 
market was more extensive than the city. Plans developed for the 
city would be weakened by leaving so much out. But plans for 
the entire region would be irrelevant, since agreement on action by 
all the various decision-making entities serving the area would be 
far beyond the means of the user. 
The next problem was even more threatening to the study - 
disagreement on the amount of detail needed. The city planners 
wanted a detailed analysis based on a vast amount of data. But 
the operations research people, who had had experience with 
simulation models getting out of hand, wanted simplicity. The ana- 
lysts struck a compromise, but it was too simple to provide what 
the city planners wanted and too complicated to  please the opera- 
tions researchers. The pitfall here was lurking in the way the ana- 
lysts presented their modeling proposals to the users. 
Constructing the argument 
The US Environmental Protection Agency wanted to  know 
whether catalytic converters on automobiles produced sulfuric 
acid emissions that would create a hazard to human health, and 
whether a delay in implementing statutory emission standards 
,would therefore be justified. Human exposure to  sulfuric acid 
concentrations in the air cannot be measured directly. One group 
of analysts used a carbon-monoxide-dispersion model to  approxi- 
mate peak hourly exposure of pedestrians near major roads for 
both normal and adverse meteorological conditions. 
Based on calculations using the model, they concluded that 
the risks exceeded the benefits after cars of four model years 
had been equipped with catalytic converters. The user then made 
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GETTING CLOSE - BUT NOT TOO CLOSE 
The ideal relationship between analyst and decision 
maker allows the analyst to maintain his scientific 
objectivity while seeing the problem from the deci- 
sion maker's point of view. If the analyst is close to 
the user - but not too close - he can consider these 
questions from an informed but detached vantage 
point: 
Toward what purpose am I working? 
Who am I trying to influence and in what way? 
What types of analytic procedures are needed? 
What approaches to these analytic tasks are 
most likely to be successful? 
The answers are matters of judgment more than 
of technique - a rational inquiry informed by the 
intuition that comes of experience with systems anal- 
ysis applications. 
If the analyst understands the decision maker 
and his needs, hewill know before the analysis begins 
whether it is to be used primarily to solve a problem 
or to inform thedecision maker and others about the 
problem. Decision makers sometimes use analysis 
merely for enlightenment without notifying the ana- 
lyst of such intentions. Knowing the use of the anal- 
ysis a t  the outset can help the analyst to provide 
effective results. 
The decision maker must be involved deeply in 
the analysis to insure i t s  success. When analyst and 
user work closely together and yet retain a respectful 
distance, the user can improve the effectiveness of 
the analysis by monitoring i t s  progress. He will not 
then be likely to judge final results on second-hand 
opinions or on misconceptions of the work. 
a controversial decision to reduce the pressure put on the auto- 
mobile companies to  install the converters. 
Subsequent analyses have revealed that the conclusion rested 
on a series of worst-case assumptions that combined to  produce an 
improbable scenario. A different picture of the problem would 
have appeared if uncertainties of the data, the assumptions, and 
the calculations using the model had been made explicit and if 
appropriate sensitivity studies had been conducted. More recent 
estimates of sulfuric acid exposures show that the problem had 
been greatly exaggerated in preparing the analytic argument. 
Using the conclusions 
Research at the National Institute of Mental Health in the 
US showed that rehospitalizing mental patients following dis- 
charge could be reduced if a social worker from a patient's county 
of residence visited the hospital, established a working relationship 
with the patient, and participated in planning for discharge. The 
analysts proposed to  a state Commissioner of Public Welfare that 
he implement the practice statewide. 
In this case the pitfall was failure to  consider implementation 
problems, which became painfully clear to  the analysts when the 
C ~ i l l  anyone feel better for 
having gone along with this 
policy if it should be adopted?S 
Commissioner responded to  their proposal. Would county social 
workers throughout the state have skills equal to  those of the pro- 
ject workers? Would it be possible to maintain the project's small 
caseloads of about six patients per social worker? 
He noted that the social workers in the study had offices near 
the hospital. Would other county social workers be willing to live 
away from their families on trips to the hospitals? Who would 
provide travel funds? Who would provide training? Would hospital 
social service personnel welcome the county workers? Since the 
hospital workers would have less to  do, some might lose their jobs. 
The Commissioner noted that the readmission rates were 
respectably low to begin with, and he questioned whether the im- 
provement would ever be noticed. He ended with a question no 
analyst or  decision maker should ever fail to  ask: "Will anyone 
feel better for having gone along with this policy if it should be 
adopted?" 
PUTTING ANALYSIS TO USE 
Systems analysis can be applied merely by taking note of its find- 
ings, o r  it can be used in a policy or program based on the findings. 
When such a program is implemented, it sets the existing social, 
political, and economic arrangements in a new configuration. If 
the new configuration was intended, and if it follows from con- 
clusions drawn from the analysis, the implementation process is 
often assumed to be successful. 
A failed policy does not necessarily imply a failure of imple- 
mentation. A well implemented inappropriate action will not 
have the desired results. Implementation in such a case can only 
be seen to have failed to the extent that it did not help the key 
actors in the policy process to recognize their conceptual mis- 
takes and to take measures to correct them. 
But the opportunity for continuous trial and error should be 
built into the policy. Therefore, a successful implementation pro- 
cess should not only avoid pitfalls, but seek better and perhaps 
unpredictable paths to new ends, some of which may be unfore- 
seen at the time the policy is determined. The pitfalls of imple- 
mentation are largely invisible when the implementation process 
begins. 
The process involves many actors, all working with and 
against each other for strategic advantage as well as for end results. 
It may be helpful to see it as a loose series of games, with the 
outcome of one game affecting play of another. Some of the most 
common games of implementation, each of which suggests pitfalls 
of analysis, are outlined in this final chapter under four general 
types. 
Diverting resources 
"Easy Money." Government contracts are the mainstay of 
many corporations in the private sector of free-market economies. 
Problems arise when unqualified, unmotivated, or overpriced con- 
tractors are given important responsibilities in the execution of 
policy. A mistake in awarding such a contract is hard to correct. 
The bad contractor has blackmail power over a program manager 
who does not want to  admit the mistake. 
"Budget." Bureau chiefs like large budgets, and where incre- 
mental budgeting is practiced, the more they spend, the more they 
hope to get. Higher expenditures are often encouraged by higher 
authority. Incentives to unproductive spending are greatest when 
the bureau acts as financial intermediary, commonly as a distributor 
of grant-in-aid funds to other levels of government. At worst, the 
intermediary agency is evaluated almost exclusively on its ability 
to move money, which then is used to less than ideal effect. 
a "Funding." A grant-receiving bureau or  nonprofit organization 
maximizes a grant by padding requests for funds and minimizes 
constraints by foiling the surveillance routines of the donor 
bureau. Surveillance is especially ineffective when the aims of the 
program are hard to measure. 
a "Easy Life." Some bureaucrats invent ways not to work very 
hard while appearing to do so. More debilitating to policy imple- 
mentation, though, is working hard but only within convenient, 
habitual modes. If the policy requires a break with practice, it 
can be thwarted by such individuals. 
a "Pork Barrel." Political pressures to spread patronage money 
around are not necessarily detrimental, unless financial resources 
need to be concentrated in order to reach some threshold of effec- 
tiveness. Care must be taken to focus implementation for enough 
concentration of resources to have the desired results. 
Deflecting goals 
"Keeping the Peace." New laws for environmental protection, 
worker health and safety, and other social regulation create oppor- 
tunities for zealots to gain control of regulatory apparatus. Others 
representing the status quo may move in to neutralize the new 
programs - by installing their sympathizers, by writing weak stan- 
dards or guidelines, by lightening penalties for violators, or by set- 
ting high standards of proof for violations. Implementation can be 
neutralized in such an environment. 
"Up for grabs." This occurs when opposing policy proponents, 
each with a different concept of an agency's objectives, alternately 
gain control of the agency. The effect is similar to Keeping the 
Peace: neutralization of a policy's implementation. 
"Piling on." If a new program enjoys success, its political 
support expands. It then becomes a target for interests that have 
only a minimal commitment to its objectives. By the time the 
piling on is over, the original program goal may be submerged, or 
the supporting coalition may have collapsed under the weight of 
the new interests. 
Dissipating energies 
a "Tenacity." If participants in the implementation process 
have different preferences for how fast the program should get 
under way, those who want speed are vulnerable to manipulation 
by those who want delay or who are less concerned with speed. 
The great danger is that the holdout faction will go too far, so 
that everyone becomes discouraged and the implementation col- 
lapses for lack of political or  financial support. 
"Territory." Bureaucratic competition for control of the 
implementation can be constructive, o r i t  can interfere with efforts 
to coordinate the responsibilities of different agencies at the 
operating level. 
"Not Our Problem." This game is the opposite of Territory. 
Agencies shrink from the new responsibility, which is seen as bur- 
densome or unglamorous. It also happens when an agency is getting 
new assignments without increased budgetary resources. Imple- 
mentation can be put off for years in such cases. 
"Odd Man Out." The uncertainties of collective action make 
it practical for actors to keep an option to withdraw from projects. 
The strategy sometimes entails maneuvering other agencies into 
losing withdrawal options -- typically by imposing costs on them 
and thereby giving them too great an interest in the project to 
abandon it. When theintended victim resists the strategy, the result 
tends to be a stalemate. 
"Reputation." Politicians seek reputations for being sensitive 
to their constituencies. Policy analysts seek reputations for being 
sophisticated, high-powered, and helpful. Policy makers seek repu- 
tations for being sound, discreet, loyal, able to shape a consensus, 
and - let us now hope - able to avoid the common pitfalls of 
systems analysis. The effects of playing Reputation are not all bad. 
The dangers come when the actor persuades others that he is doing 
more or better than he really is, or when his posturing demoralizes 
individuals doing more constructive but less visible work in imple- 
menting a program. 
FOR MORE INFORMATION 
A more extensive discussion of the pitfalls of sys- 
tems analysis, including elaboration of many of the 
points made in this report, is available in: Pitfalls of 
Analysis, edited by Giandomenico Majone and 
E.S. Quade (Wiley, Chichester, UK, 1980). 
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